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Abstract  This Paper proposes an ECDH key exchange method and an ECsig Digital Signature 
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1. Introduction 
IPSec framework is a set of open standards developed by the IETF, which uses IKE(Internet 
Key Exchange)protocol to create and exchange key between IPSec peers and authenticate  remote 
peer. 
IKE is a two-phase, multimode protocol that offers three authentication methods such as 
preshared key, public key signature and public key encryption. [1] 
IKE 1st phase Security Association has various problems at raising security performance.  
IPSec uses DH key exchange and RSA signature during IKE 1st phase, therefore it has slow 
modular exponentiation calculation and attack algorithms that attacker can find secure key.  
To design high intensity IKE, Previous works[1] already defined )(
2m
FE group for IKE, but the 
elliptic curves over )( 1552FE  group and )( 1852FE  group have non prime extension degree( m ), 
therefore security performance is not guarantee.  
And previous works[2,3] defined elliptic curve group )( pFE , but the operation over prime field 
pF  is less effective than the operation over binary field mF2  in implementing hardware, so it can’t be 
used to implement portable device. 
Next, all of the man-in-the middle attack prevention methods excepting initiator identification 
protection method have been proposed in the case of using preshared key authentication mode, 
because two IPSec peers have already shared key previously. 
But because IKE 1st phase authenticated with signature has not the preshared key between IPSec 
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peers, it can not use above methods. 
Therefore, in this case, we must protect initiator identification from attacker.  
Paper proposes an ECDH key exchange method and an ECsig Digital Signature Authentication 
method based on )(
2m
FE group with Koblits curve, man-in-the-middle attack prevention method for 
SA payload and initiator identification payload . 
 
2. IKE Design method with ECDH key exchange and ECSig signature 
1) Selection of )(
2m
FE group with  Koblitz curve and the DH group identifier Definition in IKE 
1st phase security association. 
Elliptic curve group )( pFE  defined over prime field pF  and elliptic curve group )( 2mFE  
defined over binary field mF2  are usually used in elliptic curve cryptography, 
Because operation over mF2  is more effective than operation over pF  in implementing hardware, 
EC group over mF2  is widely used in implementing commercially. 
 Therefore, in this paper we select five Koblitz curves defined over mF2  among elliptic curves 
recommended by NIST and implements these curves in IPSec. 
Koblitz curves used in this paper are as follows. 
K-163: a = 1, b = 1, h = 2, f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 
Np = 0x 00000004 00000000 00000000 00020108 A2E0CC0D 99F8A5EF 
K-233: a = 0, b = 1, h = 4, f(x) = x233 + x74 + 1 
Np = 0x 00000080 00000000 00000000 00000000 00069D5B B915BCD4 6EFB1AD5 
F173ABDF 
K-283: a = 0, b = 1, h = 4, f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1 
Np = 0x 01FFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFE9AE 2ED07577 265DFF7F 
265DFF7F 94451E06 1E163C61 
K-409: a = 0, b = 1, h = 4, f(x) = x409 + x87 + 1 
Np = 0x 007FFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFE5F 
83B2D4EA 20400EC4 557D5ED3 E3E7CA5B 4B5C83B8 E01E5FCF 
K-571: a = 0, b = 1, h = 4, f(x) = x571 + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1 
Np = 0x 02000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
00000000 131850E1 F19A63E4 B391A8DB 917F4138 B630D84B E5D63938 1E91DEB4 
5CFE778F 637C1001 
Where, a and b are coefficients, f(x) is reduction, NP  is group order(prime) of basic point(P), h is 
co-factor and NP × h is the number of points over Koblitz curve.  
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To indicate groups for ECDH key exchange proposed in this paper, optional DH group identifiers 
except that  must or should be used in default IKE are used.  
)( 1632FE group             DH group identifier   5 
  )( 2332FE group    :       DH group identifier 15   
  )( 2832FE group    :      DH group identifier 16   
  )( 4092FE group    :       DH group identifier 17 
  )( 5712FE group    :       DH group identifier 18 
Origenal DH group identifiers 5 indicates 1536bit modp group and DH group identifier 15 ~ 18 
indicate 3072bit modp group, 4096bit modp group, 6144bit modp group, 8192bit modp group  
respectively.  
2) Main mode of IKE 1st phase security association  with ECDH key exchange and ECSig 
signature 
   Figure 1 shows main mode of IKE 1st phase security association with ECDH key exchange and 
ECSig signature. 
     initiator (i)                     responder(r) 
     -----------                            ----------- 
①   HDRi, SAi            Æ 
②                        Å        HDRr, SAr 
③  HDRi, KEi, Ni         Æ  
④                            Å       HDRr, KEr, Nr 
⑤     HDRi*, IDii, [ CERT, ] SIG_I Æ 
⑥                        Å  HDRr*, IDir, [ CERT, ]  SIG_R 
Figure 1.  main mode of IKE 1st phase with ECDH key exchange and ECSig signature. 
Here, SAi and SAr indicate SA payload of initiator and responder, KE is key exchange payload 
which contains the ECDH public key (for example, in the case of initiator, KEi= Ki×P), N is nonce 
payload, ID is identification payload (for example, in the case of initiator, IDii), CERT is the ECC 
certificate payload of initiator or responder, SIG_I and SIG_R are the ECSig signature payloads of 
initiator and responder.   
－computing keying material 
When exchanging ECDH public key, the following keying material are used and the value 
SKEYID is computed separately for each authentication method.  
For signatures: SKEYID = prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, Ki×Kr×P) 
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Here, Ki and Kr are secure keys of initiator and responder, P is basic point of elliptic curve group 
)(
2m
FE and  the  meaning of rest payloads is the same as default.   
For public key encryption: SKEYID = prf(hash(Ni_b | Nr_b), CKY-I | CKY-R) 
For pre-shared keys: SKEYID = prf(pre-shared-key, Ni_b |Nr_b) 
The result of either Main Mode or Aggressive Mode is three groups of authenticated keying 
material and these materials are as follows: 
SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, Ki×Kr×P | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0) 
SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | Ki×Kr×P | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1) 
 SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | Ki×Kr×P | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2) 
The values of 0, 1, and 2 above are represented by a single octet. The key used 
for encryption is derived from SKEYID_e. 
To authenticate exchange, the initiator of the protocol generates HASH_I and the responder 
generates HASH_R.  
Where: 
HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, Ki×P | Kr×P | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b ) 
HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, Kr×P | Ki×P | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b 
For authentication with digital signatures, HASH_I and HASH_R are signed and verified; for 
authentication with either public key encryption or pre-shared keys, HASH_I and HASH_R directly 
authenticate the exchange.  
prf(key, msg) is the keyed pseudo-random function and this function is used both for key 
derivations and for authentication. 
－ using )(
2m
FE  group with  Koblitz curve in IKE 1st phase security association 
Before starting IKE 1st phase security association, each initiator and responder has own ECC certificate 
from certificate authority (CA). At that time, two IPsec peers know DH group identifier number to use from 
public key length of ECC public key certificate issued by CA(two peers must have peer’s ECC public key 
certificate)  
 
3. Man-in-the-middle attack prevention method based on PKI/ECC in IKE 1st phase 
security association 
 
When using main mode with ECDH key exchange and ECsig  signature, IKE 1st phase security 
association with the confidentiality of SA payload and initiator identification protection  is as follows. 
         initiator                                               responder 
①  HDRi, {SAi}pr       Æ 
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②                                  Å  HDRr, {SAr}pi 
③  HDRi, KEi, Ni       Æ  
④                               Å HDRr, KEr,Nr,[IDir,[CERT,],SIG_R]ECDH 
                ⑤ HDRi*, IDii,[CERT,]SIG_I Æ 
Figure 2. Man-in-the-middle attack prevention method for main mode 
 
Where, pr and pi indicate ECC public key of responder and initiator. 
{ }x indicates that encrypts messages within the { } form with public key(x) using ECC.  
[ ]ECDH shows that encrypts messages within the [ ] form with ECDH shared key value using 
secret key encryption algorithm.  
When creating SIG_I and SIG_R, improved IKE uses the following formula. 
        HASH_I=prf(SKEYID, Ki×P|Kr×P|CKY-I|CKY-R|SAi_b|SAr_b | IDii_b ) 
HASH_R=prf(SKEYID, Kr×P|Ki×P|CKY-R|CKY-I|SAr_b|SAi_b|IDir_b 
Above HASH formula shows integrity for SAi, SAr, IDii and IDir payload.   
4. Character Evaluation and Conclusion 
The table 1  and table 2 show comparison between previous IKE protocol and proposed method 
in this paper.  
Table 1.  Comparison of security performance, computing number, message  exchange number, 
applying number  
 
Protocol name 
Key exchange 
mode and 
computing 
number 
Signature 
method and
computing 
number 
HASH use
and 
computing 
number 
message  
exchange 
number
Public key 
Cryptography 
applying  
number 
IKE 
(IKE 1st 
phase  main 
mode) 
DH/ECDH(4)
RSASig/ 
ECSig (2)
 
default(2) 
 
6 
 
×  
Improved IKE 
(IKE 1st phase  
main mode) 
DH/ECDH(4)
RSASig/ 
ECSig (2)
 
improved(2)
 
5 
 
ECC(2) 
 
 6
 
Table 2.  Comparison of security performance and applying number  
 
Protocol name 
key use in 
secret key 
algorithm 
and  
appling 
number 
identification 
protection
DoS attack 
prevention
SA 
payload 
protection 
EC group 
used 
Application  
device 
IKE 
(IKE 1st 
phase  main 
mode) 
Same key  
use in  
5,6 step(2) 
○ 
 
× 
× E(Fp) 
 
desktop 
Improved IKE 
(IKE 1st phase  
main mode) 
different key 
 use in 3, 4  
step(2) 
○ 
 
○ ○ 
E(Fp), 
)(
2m
FE  
desktop, 
portable 
Where , ×  indicates no support , ○ indicates support. 
As showed at this table, we know that improved IKE protocol has higher security performance 
and is suitable to implement in portable device than present IKE protocol. 
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